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Middle-Ground Ethics: Can One Be Politically Realistic  




Thinking about international affairs has oscillated between idealism and realism throughout the 
modern period. Moralists continue to search for a way to combine what is reasonable in each in an 
ethically defensible middle between those extremes. Such efforts often yield a soft version of 
political realism: an ethics of compromise between moral ideals and real-world interests. But this 
resolution fails to escape an awkward dichotomy between “morality” and “reality,” as if moral 
considerations were not real and interests never illusory. It also rests on a simplistic conception of 
politics. Politics is distinguished from other activities in being concerned with obligations prescribed 
and enforced within a legal order, and those who make political decisions cannot ignore these 
obligations. Political decision-making must therefore take account of law, which is distinct from 
both morality and interest. Law may have its ultimate justification in moral principle, but it provides 
reasons for acting that are distinct from moral reasons. This is true of law at any level, including 
international law. Law also has material as well as normative force as part of the world in which 
decisions are made. A more nuanced middle-ground ethics, then, would take account of law as 
making demands of its own. If we bring law into the picture, we discover limits to action that are 
grounded on neither morality nor interest.  
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MIDDLE-GROUND ETHICS  
 
The expression “middle-ground ethics” comes from the English School of International Relations, 
whose luminaries—Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, and Hedley Bull—staked its identity on 
reconciling the imperatives of morality and politics. For them, political ethics should seek a balance 
between moral limits on state conduct and the real interests of states.1 The question is whether it can 
achieve that balance without collapsing into political realism. English School theorizing affirms the 
importance of morality, but with the realist reservation that moral concerns must yield to political 
interests, at least when those interests are “vital” or “supreme.”2 The result is a compromise between 
morality and expediency, or, to be mischievous, between justice and injustice. The point is not that 
such a compromise is morally problematic—that much is clear enough—but that it is incoherent 
without a theory of how an interest can nullify an obligation.   
 A more promising approach to middle-ground ethics is through the idea of international 
society—the idea that the world is neither a universal moral order nor an amoral order of power 
politics, but a society of states. Each state pursues its interests within a framework of common 
interests and rules. This understanding of the international order, which is central to English School 
thinking, emerged in Europe during the early modern period and is still relevant despite the changes 
wrought by globalization. To eighteenth-century observers, European international society worked 
on principles—a common law of nations and the balance of power as a policy of resisting 
hegemony—unknown elsewhere in the world. Some thought that what united the peoples of Europe, 
and distinguished them from other peoples, were the beliefs and ways of life they shared, above all 
the Christian faith and similar systems of law. Others thought their adherence to a common body of 
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international laws and diplomatic procedures was more important than any similarities in uniting 
them.3 Disagreement about the relative importance of these elements—shared interests and common 
rules—in international society is no closer to resolution today than it was two hundred–plus years 
ago.  
 Such disagreement is evident in the writings of English School theorists and those influenced 
by them. All agree that the idea of international society is fundamental, but they disagree about how 
it should be defined. The disagreement is in fact the same as that which marked the eighteenth-
century debate: some (“solidarists”) identify international society with shared beliefs, values, and 
interests; others (“pluralists”) with, at best, a thin or minimal body of common rules. Common rules 
are needed most when religious or material differences run deep. In a society of states, on this 
(pluralist) view, foreign policy choices that would in the absence of common rules be determined 
solely by considerations of interest and power must now also respond to “moral” considerations, 
such as those prescribed by rules forbidding aggression or wartime atrocities. Considerations of this 
sort are not instrumental to realizing national goals; they are constraints on what may be done to 
achieve such goals. States can pursue their goals, individually and collectively, provided they do so 
within those constraints. The principle that defines international society and is the basis of 
international law is in its starkest form one of coexistence: states must not interfere with one 
another’s independence except to resist interference. This principle is one of the core tenets of just 
war theory and of the larger theory of international justice to which just war theory belongs. 
According to that larger theory, which extends beyond the question of war to questions of human 
rights, social justice, and international organization, principles of justice are principles that could 
without moral impropriety be enforced as law. By defining justice as justifiable coercion, the theory 
acknowledges the moral potential of civil and international law, even if actual laws are often unjust.4  
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 This theory provides a way to avoid assimilating middle-ground ethics to political realism. 
The English School was right in linking that middle to the idea of a society of states, which takes the 
existence and legitimacy of states as a given. The “middle” here is not a compromise between 
morality and interest but a morally acceptable way of recognizing the claims of law even when they 
clash with those of morality. A state is an arrangement for making collective decisions in situations 
in which people are presumed to disagree, and it provides procedures for resolving disagreements. 
For the state to function as a system of laws that includes such procedures and the outcomes they 
generate, the demands it makes on its members must be acknowledged as authoritative. Middle-
ground ethics must take seriously the claims of law and it must allow for politics as involving 
deliberation about what should be law.  
The idea of politics is therefore important for any view of middle-ground ethics, not just a 
realist view. Political theorists today have rediscovered politics as a realistic corrective to the 
abstract moralism of liberal thought, exemplified for them by the justice-preoccupied theories of 
Immanuel Kant and John Rawls. Against such theories, a literature in defense of politics has sprung 
up. Some of its contributors defend an idealized democratic politics, others a conception of politics 
as an activity of making actual decisions, rather than a Kantian or Rawlsian exercise in abstract 
reasoning.5 Of particular relevance here are “new realist” efforts to give political theory a less 
idealistic character than that which is characteristic of twentieth-century theories of liberal justice or 
the theories of their democratic critics. But these efforts have struggled, like English School ethics, 
to avoid collapsing into reason of state. In my view, if politics is important, those who favor a 
realistic approach must give attention to law, which is not only an ideal but also part of the “real 
world” in which ethical judgments are made.  
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THE NEW REALISTS    
 
There is a danger in embracing the expression “political realism,” with its connotation that moral 
concerns must give way to prudential ones. The problem is to find a realistic approach to political 
ethics that avoids the kind of realism suggested by the expressions raison d’état and realpolitik. One 
critic of a moralizing approach to politics, Bernard Williams, defines realism in political ethics as a 
way of thinking in which “all the considerations that bear on political action—both ideals and, for 
example, political survival—can come to one focus of decision.”6 He gives as an example Max 
Weber’s “ethic of responsibility,” which recognizes that to govern is to use force, in violation of 
morality when necessary. The alternative, for Weber, is a Christian “ethic of conviction,” illustrated 
in the Sermon on the Mount, which teaches that to act on moral grounds is to refuse even to inquire 
about the consequences of one’s acts.7 This does not mean that different considerations can be 
measured and weighed to yield an unequivocal answer to a practical question. Quite the contrary: it 
is Weber’s and presumably Williams’s point that values are not only diverse but incommensurable, 
that embracing one value may mean rejecting another, and that one should acknowledge this 
indeterminacy and take responsibility for the consequences of one’s decisions. For Weber, 
governing means acting in situations that sometimes require an official to dirty his hands for the 
public good—by authorizing lies, torture, or violations of the laws of war, for example. Morality, 
however important, is not the only consideration in acting. According to Williams, the fallacy of 
what he calls “political moralism” is to think that moral considerations are supremely important. 
They are morally important, by definition, but in a world of plural values it’s not clear why moral 
considerations should override all others.  
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Another of the new realists, Raymond Geuss, also sees moralism as an obstacle to realistic 
politics. According to Geuss, we need a theory of politics that avoids the fallacy of applied ethics, 
which is to think that one can devise an ideal ethical system and then use its principles to make 
political choices. The political moralist fails to see that politics generates nonmoral reasons for 
action and that moral reasons must sometimes yield to nonmoral ones. There is never a right thing to 
do in general, only what is right at a given moment.8 If the right thing to do is contingent on 
circumstances, the word “right” identifies not what is morally or legally justifiable, but rather what 
is expedient given certain desired ends. It names a prudential concept, one that is most at home in a 
utilitarian or realist ethic.  
 Geuss distinguishes his view from what he calls “hard-edged” political realism, which holds 
that moral talk is empty and that politics is always a struggle for dominance. What’s wrong with 
hard-edged realism, he rightly argues, is that its core ideas—interest and power—are no more stable 
than the moral ideas it rejects.9 But the soft-edged realism he defends remains prudential because, 
unlike the moralism of Kant or Rawls, which prescribes moral constraints to be observed in 
pursuing substantive goals, it refuses to privilege morality by establishing a lexical ordering of 
considerations in which moral considerations constrain the pursuit of desired ends. If there is a 
difference between the new realism and the old reason of state on this point, it’s hard to see what it 
is.  
 
JUSTICE AS JUSTIFIABLE COERCION  
 
The realist ethics that properly adjusts ideal morality to the demands of political life is not an ethics 
that rationalizes moral wrongs. It’s an ethics that limits coercive interference, including coercion by 
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the state in the form of legally enforceable obligations, by specifying the ends for which coercion is 
justifiably used. Law should, at a minimum, provide a way for people with different beliefs, values, 
and interests to coexist. To do this, law must be “just” in the sense that it respects the independence 
of each. No one should be made an unwilling instrument of someone else’s purposes. This principle 
provides a basis for assessing the justice of a legal order. Kant had it right: the first principle by 
which laws should be judged is that we should not coercively interfere with one another’s choices 
except as necessary to resist unjustified interference (as in the case of self-defense). Nor should law 
permit anyone to interfere with others’ choices even if, like the benign slave owner, they don’t 
actually interfere. If legal order requires that laws be enforced, justice requires that they deserve 
enforcing.  
The question of justice, on this view, is the question of the kinds of obligations a state can 
properly prescribe and enforce as law. The basic rationale of the state is that laws are necessary to 
protect its members from wrongful interference. A state is necessary because we need an authority 
to make and apply laws and instruments of power to enforce them. The argument is not only that we 
are better off with laws than without them, but also that to live according to law is morally 
necessary. A state can of course misuse its coercive power. This misuse can be corrected only if that 
power is not merely legitimized, as Weber and his new realist followers argue, but legitimized in a 
way that acknowledges the right of individuals to be independent. There are different legitimation 
narratives—religious, collectivist, “Asian,” and the like—but only the liberal narrative 
acknowledges this right. The political relationship is a relationship of fellow legal subjects, not one 
of domination and subservience. To be legitimate, the law must be “just” in the sense that it protects 
each person from being used against his or her will for someone else’s purposes. This rationale 
works at the international level as well, explaining what is wrong in relationships between peoples 
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that are, like many forms of colonialism, relationships of domination and exploitation akin to 
slavery in the individual realm.10  
The idea of justice as a standard for judging law mediates between morality and interest by 
prescribing how people can coexist on the basis of rules that forbid relationships of domination as 
well as wrongful interference. Arguing about justice, so understood, is itself an aspect of political 
deliberation, which involves making decisions about the laws that order a political community. 
Political moralism extracts political guidance from moral principles without taking account of the 
existence and authority of those rules. It naively assumes that what is morally right should be legally 
required, or that what is morally wrong cannot be required. But if laws are the outcome of 
authoritative procedures, that is a reason for treating them as obligatory apart from the substance of 
what they prescribe. In my view, a properly realistic understanding of politics would recognize that 
authority and obligation are distinct from moral rightness or substantive desirability. Politics is not 
only about respecting moral rights or producing desirable consequences. It is also about maintaining 
a system of laws and deciding whether particular laws need to be changed or are proper to be 
enacted or enforced. One might object to a proposed statute, for example, if enforcing it would 
require intrusive searches or preventive detention. Justice as a political consideration insists that 
laws should not become instruments of domination. We must also pay attention to the requirements 
of nondomination at the international level, which means being concerned with the proper aims of 
international law. In the emerging global order, civil and international justice are in any case 
increasingly connected.  
These points can be said to belong to a “realistic” view of politics without being “realist” in 
holding that moral considerations should yield to prudential ones. They suggest that to acknowledge 
the place of law is to recognize that political authority is distinct from moral legitimacy. Political 
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authority rests on beliefs current in a given society, not on moral principle. It is, in Weber’s terms, a 
matter of perceived rather than rationally grounded moral legitimacy. The argument that a state 
cannot have authority unless it is morally legitimate confuses moral and political considerations. A 
law that is morally questionable can still be authoritative because “authority” and “morality” are 




The defect of political moralism in international affairs is that it ties authority, and therefore 
sovereignty, too tightly to moral legitimacy. There is a connection, but that it must be a loose one is 
evident if we understand the international order as a society of states whose members are politically 
and culturally diverse. How much diversity is desirable is a political question debated not only 
within the English School but in the larger world of international affairs as well. At least some 
degree of diversity is implicit in the idea of an international society whose members are politically 
independent or self-determining. This independence, or sovereignty, is a matter of belief and 
conduct, not moral judgment: states are sovereign because people treat them as sovereign, not 
because they are morally legitimate.  
Moralists sometimes argue, against the separation of moral legitimacy and political 
authority, that morally illegitimate states are not entitled to the independence the word “sovereignty” 
implies. By making moral legitimacy the criterion of sovereignty, they set a high standard for states 
that claim the right to self-government. If states that fail to meet this standard cannot claim that 
right, they are not sovereign. Taken literally, this means that their regimes can be forcibly changed 
without violating the nonintervention rule that normally protects states from foreign interference.11 
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To argue that the rule should not protect morally illegitimate states is to propose grounds for 
coercive interference far more permissive than those that compose the traditional doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, which limits intervention to genocide and other “crimes against 
humanity.” Intervention is not permissible in the case of lesser crimes, and certainly not to remove 
illiberal or nondemocratic regimes. In my view, to make moral legitimacy the criterion of 
sovereignty is to deny states that do not meet the criterion the right to manage their own affairs. 
Such a view is not only impractical; it is objectionable because it denies nondemocratic states the 
independence to which they are, despite their imperfections, morally entitled under any reasonably 
pluralistic understanding of international order. Coercive intervention is impermissible, then, unless 
the injustice rises to a level that would make not intervening an injustice.  
The sovereign rights of a state whose government is committing great crimes are not violated 
by military action to suppress those crimes. Citizens who commit crimes may be deprived of the 
freedom to do certain things, but not their status as citizens and the freedom from domination that 
goes with it. The offender is a criminal but not someone without legal rights, an outlaw. Similarly, a 
criminal state loses its independence with respect to its crimes when they exceed a certain threshold, 
but not necessarily in other matters. It loses some but not all of its rights. Its government cannot be 
overthrown unless overthrowing it is necessary to suppress the crimes. If not, forcible regime 
change infringes its independence and violates the rights the state still has.  
It might be argued that when its crimes cross a certain threshold, the offending state loses its 
legal authority as well as its moral legitimacy, because it is not only a criminal state but one that has 
chosen to sever the social contract by treating its citizens as enemies. Jean Cohen makes this point 
when she says that atrocities like genocide and ethnic cleansing must be understood not only 
morally but also politically because they aim to destroy the political agency of the victimized 
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groups. “By denying . . . the very right to have rights within the state, the government forfeits the 
claim to speak for and the ‘right to coercively rule’ the groups it excludes and oppresses.”12 Strictly 
speaking, such a government might be said to speak for those it does not exclude and oppress, but 
the basis of its authority would then be that it provides legal order for some of its subjects while 
denying it to others. This is not an argument against regime change that the international community 
need accept, however, especially when the domination reaches genocidal proportions. Those who 
would replace the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention with the broader idea of a 
“responsibility to protect” implicitly endorse this conclusion when they argue that rescue is not 
enough and that regime change is sometimes justified to restore justice. Michael Walzer, for 
example, now argues that a murderous government is “a legitimate candidate for forcible 
transformation” and that the intervening forces have “some degree of responsibility for the creation 
of an alternative government.”13 Arguments like these lower the threshold for regime change, but 
they do not challenge the distinction between authority and legitimacy or justify coercive 
intervention to reform illiberal states whose offenses against human rights are less grave.  
A properly realistic middle-ground ethics must acknowledge the normative force of law. It 
must allow that, as legal orders, states and international institutions have a claim to limit what is 
done for the sake of either morality or prudence. Against political moralism, it defends the authority 
of political institutions as the outcome of choices made according to recognized procedures. 
Additionally, it defends international society as a framework in which justice can be realized not 
only between states but also internally and transnationally, in a global order in which states continue 
to have an acknowledged place. Against political realism, it asserts that law is no mere ideal but a 
source of enforceable obligations that are part of the reality that political decisions must take into 
account. Keeping this in mind allows us to distinguish a middle-ground ethics based on the idea of 
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justice as justifiable coercion from the political realism with which it is too easily confused. It also 
suggests a solution to the problem of articulating a middle-ground ethics as posed within the English 
School tradition. Instead of seeing the middle ground as a compromise between morality and 
expediency, we might see it as determined by the idea of justice in international society. The 
problem to be solved is to create an international legal order that acknowledges the independence of 
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